Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism by Littlejohn, Clayton Mitchell
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Littlejohn, C. M. (2014). Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion, 1, 77-87.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism 
Clayton Littlejohn1 
 
According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to 
best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical 
hypotheses are false.  On this view, commonsense beliefs 
about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized 
dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and 
so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats.  This 
explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we 
press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're 
trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about external 
objects and how we could have access to it.     
 
Introduction 
Please consider two hypotheses:  
BIV: Your body consists of nothing more than a brain 
that's currently housed in a vat of nutrients in a lab in 
Nevada.  Scientists are conducting experiments on your 
brain to see whether it's possible to systematically deceive 
you about the nature of your surroundings and about the 
past.  They cause you to undergo experiences that are 
indistinguishable from the experiences you're having right 
now and induce false memories to trick you into believing 
various things about the past.    
Hands: Your body consists of much more than just a brain.  
You have a pair of hands that you can see when held out in 
front of you. 
You know that these hypotheses cannot both be true.  It's quite natural to think that you 
know that the Hands-hypothesis is true.  It's also quite natural to think that you couldn't 
know the Hands-hypothesis to be true unless you were in a position to know that the 
BIV-hypothesis was false.  Because of this, it seems quite natural to think that you're in a 
position to know that the BIV-hypothesis is false.  Let's suppose that's right.  The 
question that concerns us here isn't whether you can know that you're not a BIV, but how 
you could know this on the assumption that you can. 
 An increasingly popular explanation of how you could know that a skeptical 
hypothesis is false is the explanationist explanation.2  The gist of the explanationist view is 
that we can justifiably believe and know that we're not BIVs because the best explanation 
of our evidence (or features of our evidence) is an explanation that appeals to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I would like to thank Matthew Frise, Jon Matheson, Kevin McCain, Andrew Moon, 
and Chris Tucker for discussion and feedback on a previous draft.   
2 See BonJour (1999), Feldman (2001), Lipton (2004), Lycan (2002), McCain (2014), 
Moser (1988), and Vogel (1990) for sympathetic presentations of the explanationist 
responses to skepticism. 
commonsense beliefs, such as the belief that you have hands.3  Assuming that we do 
indeed have hands and that we're not BIVs, it's an inference to best explanation that 
provides the justification we need to know that we're not BIVs. 
 Some critics of this approach will criticize the idea that inference to best 
explanation provides justification or knowledge-level justification for our beliefs.  For the 
purposes of this paper, let's bracket general concerns people have raised about the 
epistemic power of inference to best explanation.  The question we shall focus on here is 
whether the explanationist view provides a satisfactory account of how we can know that 
a skeptical hypothesis like the BIV-hypothesis is false.  
  To understand the explanationist view, it will be helpful to briefly discuss a 
familiar skeptical argument and some standard responses to it.  Let's start with the 
argument from ignorance:  
The Skeptical Argument from Ignorance 
P1. You cannot know that you're not a BIV. 
P2. If you cannot know that you're not a BIV, you cannot 
know that you have hands. 
C. Thus, you cannot know that you have hands.  
You could simply accept the argument's conclusion for the reasons (or 'reasons') given.  
Some do have the strong intuition that we cannot know that we're not BIVs, so the 
skeptical view has something to be said for it insofar as it vindicates an intuition some of 
us surely have.  The downside of skepticism, of course, is skepticism.  Many of us think 
that it's at least possible to know things about the external world. Accepting the 
argument's conclusion is taken by many of us to be a significant cost.  If you want to 
resist the skeptical argument, you could deny the argument's second premise.  You might 
say that there are counterexamples to the closure principle and say that the case we're 
dealing with is a perfectly good counterexample to the general principle.  The downside 
of this response is that the closure principle strikes many of us as being well motivated. 
While this view might vindicate the intuition that we can know that we have hands, it 
does so in a very costly way.  Let's suppose we want to retain closure and want a view that 
allows for the possibility of knowledge of the external world.  Setting contextualist views 
aside, let's consider the prospects of an explanationist view that denies the argument's 
first premise. 
 If you deny the first premise of the skeptical argument, you'll face the non-trivial 
challenge of explaining how it could be false.  I think it's helpful here to remember 
Pryor's (2000) advice.  We shouldn't simply assume that the argument's first premise is 
correct.  We should press those who accept the argument's first premise for an 
explanation as to why we should do likewise.  One way to try to motivate it is by appeal 
to three ideas.  The first is that we couldn't know that we're not BIVs unless we were 
justified in believing that we're not BIVs.4  The second is that we couldn't be justified in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a helpful discussion of explanationism that focuses on attempts to justify inference 
to best explanation, see Beebe (2009). 
4 This is controversial, but let's set this aside for the time being as I'm going to talk as if 
knowledge requires justification because it's convenient to do so.  Nothing of importance 
here hangs on any controversial claims about the relationship between justification and 
believing that we're not BIVs unless we had adequate experiential evidence for believing 
that we're not BIVs.5 The third is that we cannot have adequate evidence for believing 
that we're not BIVs.6 
 The first two points seem relatively unproblematic, but consider the third.  Why 
shouldn't we say that our evidence is adequate for believing that the BIV-hypothesis is 
false?  Perhaps this is what we should say.  If we do say this, we'll be pressed to explain 
how our evidence could be adequate for supporting this belief.  As many epistemologists 
see it, we'd have the same evidence for our beliefs regardless of whether the Hands-
hypothesis or the BIV-hypothesis is true.7  Doesn't that show that our evidence couldn't 
be adequate for believing the Hands-hypothesis and rejecting the BIV-hypothesis? 
 Although there are epistemologists who will say that you couldn't have adequate 
evidence for believing that you're not a BIV unless you had evidence that wasn't available 
to a BIV, the explanationist view is supposed to explain how the evidence we have could 
be adequate for our beliefs even if it's just the evidence we'd have if we were BIVs.8  As 
they see it, the Hands-hypothesis provides the best explanation as to why our evidence is 
the way it is. If so, this explains why we have adequate evidence for believing the Hands-
hypothesis and there would be no principled objection to rejecting the first premise of the 
skeptical argument. 
 To flesh out the details of the explanationist view, the explanationist needs to 
answer two questions.  First, by what criteria should we judge candidate explanations?  
Second, what is the Hands-hypothesis supposed to explain?  The explanationist can 
recommend evaluating candidate explanations in terms of virtues like simplicity (i.e., the 
number and kinds of entities posited, the internal simplicity of the explanatory 
framework), fecundity (i.e., suggests further hypotheses that would be explanatorily 
useful), neatness (i.e., leaves fewer unanswered questions than rivals), or plausibility in 
terms of how well it coheres with our other justified commitments.9  As for the features 
of our evidence that the explanatory hypotheses purport to explain, the explanationist 
might take the Hands-hypothesis to figure in the best explanation of the following 
(alleged) features of our experiential evidence:  
F1: The coherence and regularity of experiences in a single 
sense modality. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
knowledge. By speaking as if knowledge required knowledge-level justification, I can 
simplify the discussion and avoid having to talk about skeptical challenges that challenge 
different epistemic statuses.   
5 For our purposes evidence will be understood as experiential or memorial.  Let's assume 
for the purposes of this discussion that we don't have apriori justification for believing the 
BIV-hypothesis is false. 
6 See Pritchard (2012) and Pryor (2000) for discussion of this defense of the argument's 
first premise. 
7 Cohen (1984) and Conee and Feldman (2004) defend the thesis that you and your 
deceived BIV counterpart share the same evidence. 
8 See Littlejohn (2012), McDowell (1998), and Williamson (2000). 
9 See Lipton (2004) and Lycan (2002) 
F2: The coherence and regularity of experiences across 
more than one sense modality. 
F3: It typically appears to us that external objects exist 
when we expect them to and these objects typically appear 
to be the way we expect them to be.10 
The explanationist thinks that to justifiably believe or know that the BIV-hypothesis is 
false, we have to know that our experiential evidence has some combination of these 
features and discern that the best explanation of some combination of (F1)-(F3) is best 
explained by appeal to commonsense beliefs such as the belief that you have hands. 
 
Explanationism vs. Dogmatism 
It wouldn't be surprising if most readers agreed that the Hands-hypothesis provides the 
best explains the relevant features of our evidence. It also wouldn't be surprising if most 
readers agreed that inference to best explanation is generally capable of conferring 
justification.  The tricky question is whether we need to rely on inference to best 
explanation to justifiably reject the BIV-hypothesis.  As the view is understood here, the 
explanationist doesn't simply assert that inference to best explanation is one may amongst 
many to acquire justification for rejecting the BIV-hypothesis. The explanationist also 
thinks that rival views cannot provide an adequate account of how it is that we can 
justifiably believe that we're not BIVs. 
 To evaluate the explanationist view, then, we should consider a rival approach.  
Consider Pryor's (2000) dogmatist view. Like the explanationist, Pryor's dogmatist wants 
to say that we can have experiential evidence that provides sufficient evidential support 
for believing that the BIV-hypothesis is mistaken.  Like the explanationist, Pryor's 
dogmatist doesn't think that the adequacy of our evidence for believing that we're not 
BIVs depends upon whether we have evidence that our BIV-counterparts do not.  The 
disagreement between the dogmatist and the explanationist has to do with the power of 
particular experiences to justify the belief that we're not BIVs.  It's possible, Pryor thinks, 
for a particular, one-off experience to justify the belief that you have hands. Once that 
belief is justified, you can justifiably infer that you're not a BIV, provided that you know 
that the BIV-hypothesis is incompatible with the Hands-hypothesis.  Thus, on Pryor's 
view, you don't have to appeal to features like (F1)-(F3) to justify the belief that you're 
not BIV.  On his neo-Moorean view, you can bypass that and justifiably infer that you're 
not a BIV by reasoning as follows:  
  The Neo-Moorean Argument 
NM1: I have hands. 
NM2: If I have hands, I'm not a BIV. 
NMC: I'm not a BIV.  
 The explanationist and the dogmatist can agree that your justification for 
believing NM2 is apriori.  They can also agree that your justification for believing that 
NMC derives from experience.  Their disagreement concerns the power of one-off 
experiences to provide justification for believing NMC via this sort of inference.  As the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 BonJour (2003), Feldman (2004), McCain (2014), and Vogel (1990) mention these 
kinds of features in their discussions of explanationism.  
dogmatist sees it, there's no principled reason to think that the one-off experience you 
have when you see your hands is incapable of justifying your belief in NM1.  Once we've 
accepted that, the dogmatist will say that there's then no principled objection to the idea 
that that experience provides sufficient evidential support for believing NMC.  It's this 
second point that's the primary point of contention in the debate between the dogmatist 
and the explanationist. 
 If the one-off experience that you have when you see your hands is the sort of 
thing that could be sufficient to justify the belief that you have hands, the dogmatist 
thinks that it should also be sufficient to justify your belief that you're not a BIV.  The 
explanationist thinks that the one-off experience cannot provide adequate evidential 
support for rejecting the BIV-hypothesis, but this puts them in a tricky spot, doesn't it?  
Let's consider two sufficiency claims:  
S1: The one-off experience you have when you see that you 
have hands can provide sufficient evidential support for 
believing that you have hands. 
S2: The one-off experience you have when you see that you 
have hands can provide sufficient evidential support for 
believing that you're not a BIV.  
The dogmatist can run the following argument against the explanationist view:  
The First Anti-Explanationist Argument 
FAE1: The one-off experience you have when you see that 
you have hands can provide sufficient evidential support for 
believing that you have hands regardless of whether your 
experiences have features (F1)-(F3). 
FAE2: If your one-off experience as of hands can provide 
you with sufficient evidence to justifiably believe that you 
have hands regardless of whether your experiences have 
features (F1)-(F3), your one-off experience as of hands can 
provide you with sufficient evidence to justifiably believe 
that you're not a BIV regardless of whether your 
experiences have features (F1)-(F3). 
FAEC: Your one-off experience as of hands can provide 
you with sufficient evidence to justifiably believe that you're 
not a BIV regardless of whether your experiences have 
features (F1)-(F3). 
If this argument is sound, it would deliver a serious blow to the explanationist view as it 
would show that the ability to justifiably reject the BIV-hypothesis does not depend upon 
whether there's some feature of our experiential evidence that's best explained by appeal 
to commonsense beliefs like the belief in the Hands-hypothesis. 
 Although the explanationist isn't committed to closure, we're exploring the 
possibility that the explanationist can rebut the skeptical argument without denying 
closure.  It seems that if the explanationist accepts closure, they should accept (FAE2).  
The idea here isn't that the closure principle commits you to saying that (S2) follows 
from (S1).  There are coherent views that accept closure, accept (S1), but reject (S2).  
These are views on which the justification for rejecting the BIV-hypothesis doesn't derive 
from (solely) experience but must be in place for experience to justify believing that you 
have hands.11  These views differ from the explanationist view on offer insofar as they 
deny that the justification for rejecting the BIV-hypothesis derives wholly from the 
justification provided by experience.  The reason that the explanationist who accepts 
closure should accept (FAE2) is that if (F1)-(F3) are necessary for having justification to 
believe that the BIV-hypothesis is false, these are necessary for having justification to 
believe propositions that are known to entail that the BIV-hypothesis is false. 
 It looks like the explanationist will have to reject the argument's first premise, 
(FAE1).  This doesn't come without intuitive costs.  In terms of the phenomenology, it 
doesn't seem like your belief that you have hands is formed as the result of an inference 
that rests on multiple observations.12  It seems rather odd to think that the objects that 
are sitting in plain view are ens theoria.  Wouldn't it take a powerful argument to show 
that the justification for believing in such things requires the kind of inferential work 
that's required for inferring that the existence of the thing provides the best explanation 
of our evidence?   
 We shouldn't expect the explanationist to accept that this is a decisive 
counterexample to their view.  Neutral parties might be put off by the idea that the 
justification for believing that you have the hands you seem to see before you really 
derives from an inference to best explanation, but perhaps the explanationist would 
reasonably claim that they have a good reason for rejecting (S1).  They could say that we 
ought to reject (S1) because if we accept (S1) and accept closure, we'd either have to 
accept (S2) or we'd have to say that the justification for rejecting the BIV-hypothesis 
doesn't derive from our experiential evidence.  They might admit that the rejection of 
(S1) is initially counterintuitive, but they might insist that it's a price worth paying in 
light of the fact that (S2) is so deeply counterintuitive.  Is this a sufficient dialectical 
riposte? 
 If the explanationist is offering a principled response here, it seems that the 
principle that they're relying on couldn't be this one:  
ISE: Every justified belief is justified by virtue of an 
inference to best explanation.13 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For discussion of such views, see Silins (2005) who accepts a liberal view on which (S1) 
is true that isn't committed to the dogmatist view on which both (S1) and (S2) are true.  
As he argues, it's possible for someone to accept Pryor's account of the justification of 
mundane beliefs like the belief that you have hands while accepting something like 
Wright's (2004) account of the justified rejection of skeptical hypotheses.  For a critical 
discussion of Silins' proposal, see Kotzen (2012). 
12 It's interesting that Feldman (2001), for example, insists that our evidence for rejecting 
the BIV-hypothesis is indirect since he seems to agree with Pryor in his (2004) that it's 
possible for particular experiences to provide non-inferential justification for the belief 
that we have hands.  There seems to be a tension here because Feldman also endorses 
closure. 
13 An expalanationist view that incorporates ISE is even stronger than the view Lycan 
(2002: 417) dubs 'ferocious explanationism'.  According to ferocious explanationism, the 
only ampliative inferences that generate justification derive their epistemic power from 
While this impossibly strong explanationist principle supports the idea that the belief in 
the Hands-hypothesis could only be justifiably accepted on the basis of an inference to 
best explanation, the impossibly strong explanationist principle is impossibly strong.  At 
some point, mustn't we have a non-inferential way of knowing about our evidence and 
various features of our evidence so that we have a kind of direct access to something that 
we can raise questions about?  Similarly, if the inference to best explanation that 
generates justification is supposed to explain features of our evidence, it seems that we 
would need to have a way to form justified beliefs about these features of the evidence 
and at some point it seems we'd need a non-inferential way of knowing about some of the 
features of our evidence. 
 The explanationist should appeal to a weaker principle, one that allows for the 
possibility of non-inferential knowledge and justification.  The principle has to support 
the idea that the justification we have for believing the Hands- and BIV-hypotheses is 
generated by inference to best explanation but allow for the possibility of non-inferential 
justification for believing various things about our evidence.  This would do the trick:  
ME: For any proposition that's incompatible with a 
skeptical hypothesis (e.g., the BIV-hypothesis) to be 
justifiably believed, it has to be justified by an inference to 
best explanation.   
This modest explanationist principle supports the idea that you cannot justifiably believe 
that you have hands or that you're not a BIV unless the Hands-hypothesis (or something 
like it) is the something you see is part of the best explanation of your evidence. Unlike 
the impossibly strong explanationist principle, the modest principle doesn't tell us that 
you need to rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe that you have a 
headache or that it looks to you as if you have hands.  To motivate the principle, the 
explanationist might say something along these lines.  If things are going bad for us 
epistemically, we'll still have unproblematic access to our evidence.  (We'd have to have 
this kind of unproblematic access since having such access is a necessary condition on 
possessing this evidence.)  By appealing to such evidence and relying on inference to best 
explanation, we can justify beliefs about matters that go beyond this evidence.  These 
matters are things that we could potentially be mistaken about even if our evidence is just 
the way that it is.  ME is designed to capture the intuitive resistance to (S2).  There are 
some matters that we can form justified beliefs about without relying on any further 
evidence and that is that which the vat operators cannot deceive us about. There are some 
matters beyond this that we have potentially problematic access to and we can only come 
to have sufficiently good access to such matters by thinking about the evidence we have to 
hand. 
 While the explanationist might avoid the first line of objection (i.e., that it is 
implausible to think that the justification for believing the Hands-hypothesis must come 
from inference to best explanation), the maneuvers the explanationist would have to make 
steer them directly into a second line of objection.  The explanationist rejects (S1) and 
(S2), but accepts the following sufficiency thesis:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
explanatory inference. This view allows for non-inferential justified judgments, but ISE 
appears to rule that out.  
S3: The features of the experiences you have (i.e., (F1)-
(F3)) can provide sufficient evidential support for believing 
that you have hands and that you're not a BIV via inference 
to best explanation. 
If your experiences as of material objects like hands are coherent and regular both within 
and across sense modalities and there's been a pattern of objects being where you'd expect 
them to be and appearing as you'd expect them to appear, you can appeal to (F1)-(F3) to 
justify your belief that you have hands and your belief that you're not a BIV.  The view 
differs from dogmatism insofar as it denies that the one-off experience can do the trick.   
 A run of experience with certain features is needed to justify a belief, according to 
the explanationist. The one-off experience isn't going to be fit for purpose.  Assuming 
that your course of experience has the right features, it can provide the right kind of 
rational support for believing the Hands-hypothesis, provided of course that the 
experience is of a kind that's better explained by appeal to this hypothesis than a rival 
hypothesis such as the BIV-hypothesis. 
 The trouble with the explanationist approach emerges when we think about your 
relation to (F1)-(F3).  These aren't features of any particular, one-off experience.  They 
couldn't be, the explanationist says.  Not only do these features depend upon experiences 
had at different times, it's important for the explanationist to say that that these features 
aren't features of any particular, one-off experience since they accept (S3) but reject (S1) 
and (S2).  Since they are features of a series of experiences that the subject had at different 
times, the explanationist has to say that these features aren't epistemically available to you 
in the way that they'd have to be to justify your beliefs:    
The Second Anti-Explanationist Argument 
SAE1: The truth of the proposition that your experiences 
have features (F1)-(F3) depends upon whether certain 
relations hold between present and past experiences, which 
means that the truth of the proposition that your 
experiences have features (F1)-(F3) is incompatible with 
the BIV-hypothesis.  
SAE2: If the truth of the proposition that your experiences 
have features (F1)-(F3) is incompatible with the BIV-
hypothesis, you can only be justified in believing that your 
experiences have features (F1)-(F3) if such a belief is 
supported by inference to best explanation. 
SAE3: You cannot be justified in believing that your 
experiences have features (F1)-(F3) by means of an 
inference to best explanation. 
SAEC1: Thus, you cannot be justified in believing that 
your experiences have features (F1)-(F3). 
SAE4: If you cannot be justified in believing that your 
experiences have (F1)-(F3), the fact that your experiences 
have these features cannot provide rational support for 
believing that you have hands or that you're not a BIV. 
SAE5: If the fact that your experiences have these features 
cannot provide rational support for believing that you have 
hands or that you're not a BIV, you cannot justifiably 
believe that you have hands or that you're not a BIV. 
SAEC2: You cannot justifiably believe that you have hands 
or that you're not a BIV. 
The explanationist has to reject (SAEC2) since that's incompatible with (S3).  Unless 
they can block the argument, they should not say that they are offering us a non-skeptical 
view. 
 In support of the first premise, (SAE1), it should be noted that the BIV-
hypothesis does not simply target perceptual beliefs about your immediate surroundings, 
but also beliefs based on apparent memories about the past experiences you take yourself 
to have.  Just as the vat operators have the power to trick a brain in a vat that's stored in a 
lab into believing that it's sitting on the beach, it can trick a brain in a vat that's been 
created in a lab only moments ago into thinking that it's been alive for years and that it's 
had just the sorts of experiences that we do when we see hands during that time.  Thus, 
according to (ME), you cannot justifiably believe your experiences have features (F1)-
(F3) unless you can believe this on the basis of an inference to best explanation.  
Unfortunately, the features of your experiences that you'd need to appeal to in justifying 
beliefs about the experiences you've had are largely features of past experiences.  They are 
epistemically off-limits until we have a story about how you could justifiably take your 
past experiences to have had the relevant features.  Thus, so far as your beliefs about what 
your past experiences were like, it seems that you couldn't justifiably hold such beliefs 
without relying on inference to best explanation and it seems you don't have the right 
kind of access to the propositions about the explanandum for that inference to generate 
any justification.   
 Once we see why the explanationist doesn't have the right to say that our beliefs 
about our past experiences are justified, we can see why the explanationist cannot 
plausibly defend (S3) while rejecting (S1) and (S2).  The explanationist needs one-off 
apparent memories about your past experiences to be the sort of thing that can justify 
beliefs about these experiences so that you can appeal to features (F1)-(F3) to justify 
beliefs about the external world, but the explanationist denies that such one-off apparent 
memories are capable of providing that kind of justification. 
  
Conclusion 
The explanationist cannot have it both ways.  If the possibility of deception and error are 
sufficient to show that one-off experiences are incapable of justifying beliefs about 
external objects, they should be sufficient to show that one-off apparent memories are 
incapable of justifying beliefs about past experiences. Without such justified beliefs about 
the character of past experiences, we cannot rationally appeal to features like (F1)-(F3) in 
the attempt to justify the belief that we're not BIVs. We can't get our hands on the data 
that we need for inference to best explanation.  Thus, the features (F1)-(F3) cannot play 
any interesting role in any non-skeptical explanationist account of the justification of our 
beliefs about the external world.  If, however, it's possible for one-off apparent memories 
to justify beliefs about past experiences in spite of the fact that our BIV counterparts 
could have these apparent memories without having had experiences with features like 
(F1)-(F3), the explanationist doesn't have any principled reason to think that (S1) and 
(S2) are mistaken.  The skeptical pressures that they think undermine the dogmatist view 
undermine their view.  The explanationist's failure to appreciate this reflects a failure to 
appreciate the non-trivial problem they face in understanding how we could have the 
right kind of access to a series of experiences for us to appeal to these features in trying to 
justify our beliefs.  If there's never a point at which a particular experience is sufficient on 
its own to justify a belief that is subject to a skeptical challenge, there is no hope of having 
any justification for believing things about the external world. 
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